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FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
cused on interstate commerce considerations.
The Fourth Circuit examined the activity of the Fairfax County
Bar Association and determined that the association sought only to
regulate a "general local service."" The court dismissed as insignifi-
cant the fact that many homeowners seeking legal services in North-
ern Virginia worked outside of the State. The court thus found that
the practice of law regulated was wholly intrastate.24 Noting that the
alleged restraint of trade or commerce must be shown to affect inter-
state commerce in order to base a claim on a violation of the Sherman
Act, the court held that the lack of interstate commerce in the present
case was a jurisdictional defect. Thus, it reversed the district court's
judgment for the plaintiff against the Fairfax County Bar Associa-
tion.
Two recent developments, one judicial and one legislative, have
resulted in keeping current the issues discussed in Goldfarb. Specifi-
cally, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
Goldfarb in October 1974.2 In addition, state statutes, modelled after
the federal anti-trust statutes, have been erected in several jurisdic-
tions.2 1 In such states the interstate commerce requirement relied on
by the Fourth Circuit in its decision would be irrelevant.
S.E.L.
II. CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. Applicability of Work Product Doctrine in Subsequent
Litigation-Duplan Corporation v. Moulinage et Retorderie de
Chavanoz, 487 F.2d 480 (4th Cir. 1973) and Civil No. 74-1221 (4th
Cir. 1974).
The Fourth Circuit recently became the first' federal circuit court
to decide whether the immunity from discovery afforded "work prod-
21 Id. at 18.
21 497 F.2d at 18.
21 Certiorari was granted on October 29, 1974. See note 1 supra.
21 For example, in Virginia a state antitrust act patterned after the federal statutes
was enacted effective July 1, 1974, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55.1-9.1 to 9.18 (1974). Under
this act there is no requirement that the action questioned be related to interstate
commerce.
I See Note, Discovery of an Attorney's Work Product in Subsequent Litigation,
1974 DuKE L.J. 799 at 817 n.95 (1974). The author of that note states that Duplan is
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uct" material' under Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure3 applies to this material after the termination of the litigation
for which it was prepared. In two appeals4 arising out of an initial
district court decision in Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc.,5 the
Fourth Circuit held that once material qualifies for Rule 26(b)(3)
protection, it will continue to be so protected in all future proceed-
only the second case dealing with the issue of discovery of a lawyer's work product in
subsequent litigation. The other case dealing with this issue is Republic Gear Co. v.
Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1967). That case, however, dealt with work
product materials developed in prior unterminated litigation whereas Duplan ad-
dressed the issue of work product materials developed in prior terminated litigation.
2 In Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) the Supreme Court described work
product as follows:
Proper preparation of a client's case demands that he [the lawyer]
assemble information, sift what he considers to be the relevant from
the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy
without undue and needless interference. ... This work is reflected,
of course, in interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence,
briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and countless other tangi-
ble and intangible ways-aptly though roughly termed by the Circuit
Court of Appeals in this case as the "work product of the lawyer."
Id. at 511.
3 FE. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(3) provides in pertinent part:
(3) Trial Preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of subdi-
vision (b)(4) of this rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents
and tangible things otherwise discoverable under subdivision (b)(1) of
this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for
another party or by or for that other party's representative (including
his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only
upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need
of the materials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable
without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the
materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such materials
when the required showing has been made, the court shall protect
against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or
legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concern-
ing the litigation.
' In the first appeal the Fourth Circuit addressed the issue of immunity from
discovery in subsequent litigation of "factual" work product materials developed in
prior terminated litigation. These materials were documents and tangible things which
did not contain any mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories of an
attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation. Duplan Corp. v.
Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 487 F.2d 480 (4th Cir. 1973) [hereinafter cited
as Duplan 1]. In the second appeal the court addressed the issue of immunity from
discovery in subsequent litigation of "opinion" work product materials developed in
prior terminated litigation. These materials were "documents" and "tangible things"
which did contain mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories. Duplan
Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, Civil No. 74-1221 (4th Cir., Oct. 18,
1974) [hereinafter cited as Duplan II].
5 61 F.R.D. 127 (D.S.C. 1973).
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ings. The court concluded that work product material must be ac-
corded the same protection in subsequent and unrelated litigation as
it received in the prior terminated litigation for which it was pre-
pared.
The basis for both appeals was a suit in which plaintiff Duplan
Corporation charged the defendant with patent and antitrust viola-
tions.' In preparation of its case, Duplan sought discovery of work
product materials prepared by the defendant's attorneys in connec-
tion with a prior suit which had resulted in settlement agreements
between the defendant and third parties. Duplan also sought discov-
ery of documents evidencing the defendant's knowledge of the state
of the prior art involved in its patented process with respect to this
previous agreement.7 The district court' ruled that the work product
materials prepared in connection with prior terminated litigation
were discoverable in the present litigation and ordered production of
the requested materials.' The court concluded that upon final termi-
nation of litigation, either by decision or settlement, the immunity
afforded the work product prepared for the litigation also ceased. The
district court certified its order for interlocutory consideration pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) 0 and the Fourth Circuit permitted an
appeal from the order.
9 See Note, Discovery of an Attorney's Work Product in Subsequent Litigation,
1974 DuKE L.J. 799 at 816 n.88 (1974).
See 487 F.2d at 481 n.2 where the court noted:
[t]he documents claimed by [Chavanoz] to be work product
were generated incident to (1) a series of lawsuits in the early 1960s
in which Leesona Corporation claimed that United States patents
owned by it were infringed by the sale and operation of machines
manufactured by a licensee of Chavanoz, or (2) a series of proceedings
in foreign countries relative to the validity and infringement of foreign
counterparts to the Chavanoz patents here in issue. It is further con-
ceded that each of these litigations was terminated prior to the comm-
encement of the present case.
See also Civil No. 74-1221 at 4-5 nn. 2 & 3.
Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 127 (D.S.C. 1973).
Id. at 135.
, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970) reads in pertinent part:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not other-
wise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such
order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is sub-
stantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal
from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of
the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of
Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be
taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten days
after the entry of the order. . ..
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In Duplan I the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's deci-
sion and held that the qualified immunity from discovery afforded
work product materials continued beyond the litigation for which the
materials were prepared, and applied in any subsequent case or liti-
gation. This immunity was described as "qualified" because the
materials sought to be discovered were not claimed to be "opinion"
work product. 3 Therefore, these "factual" materials14 were discovera-
ble on a showing of substantial need for the materials and undue
hardship in obtaining equivalent materials." The Fourth Circuit con-
cluded that absent a showing of both these conditions, "factual" work
product materials prepared in connection with prior terminated liti-
gation were immune from discovery in subsequent and unrelated
litigation.
Since neither the text of Rule 26(b)(3) nor the accompanying
Advisory Committee Note"6 addresses the question of immunity for
product materials in subsequent litigation, the Fourth Circuit relied
upon the Supreme Court decision from which Rule 26(b)(3) was de-
rived, Hickman v. Taylor. 7 In Hickman the Court considered
whether materials gathered in preparation for trial by an attorney
were freely discoverable by the opposing party. The Court noted the
conflicting interests of protecting an attorney's files and records from
unwarranted searches and the public policy that encouraged reasona-
ble and necessary inquiries in preparation for litigation.1 8 The Court
also recognized that the orderly work of the adversary system was
dependent upon the privacy afforded an attorney's efforts. 9 After
weighing these factors, the Supreme Court held that materials pre-
pared in anticipation of litigation by an attorney were discoverable
only upon a showing of "necessity or justification.""
The Fourth Circuit interpreted Hickman as standing "for the
principle that the integrity of the adversary process must be safe-
guarded in spite of the desirability of the free interchange of informa-
487 F.2d 480 (4th Cir. 1973).
,2 The court stated: "On balance we think the legal profession and the interests
of the public are better served by recognizing the qualified immunity of work product
materials in a subsequent case as well as that in which they were prepared .... 487
F.2d at 484.
'1 Civil No. 74-1221 at 7.
" See note 4 supra for definition of "factual" work product.
IS FED. R. Cir. P. 26(b)(3), note 3 supra.
' See 28 U.S.C. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 at 7777-82 (1970).
17 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
18 Id.
"1 Id. at 512.
21 Id. at 510.
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tion before trial."2 ' The court then decided that a policy of unre-
stricted discovery in a Duplan I situation would subject the adversary
process to the same dangers which the Hickman procedure attempted
to eliminate or minimize.22 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit concluded
that the holding of Hickman should apply to "factual" work product
materials in subsequent litigation even though the materials ema-
nated from prior terminated litigation.
Upon remand, the district court directed the defendant, Chava-
noz, to produce some one hundred documents.? In response to this
order, Chavanoz produced fifty-eight documents, withholding the
remaining forty-seven on the ground that Rule 26(b)(3) absolutely
protected them from discovery. Chavanoz contended that the with-
held materials contained mental impressions, conclusions, opinions
and legal theories which were prepared in anticipation of litigation
or for trial by the defendant's attorneys and other representatives.2 4
The defendant claimed that the last sentence of Rule 26(b)(3)2 af-
forded these "opinion" work product materials absolute immunity
from discovery. This claim notwithstanding, the district court or-
dered the defendant to produce twenty-two or the remaining docu-
ments.
In so ruling, the district court held that materials which included
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories relating to
the litigation for which they were developed need not always remain
characterized as such. The court noted that following the termination
of the initial proceedings, these "opinion" materials may constitute
"operative facts ' 26 in subsequent litigation. The district court de-
cided that if such a change were to occur, then the court need not
21 487 F.2d at 482-83.
2Id. at 483.
3 Civil No. 74-1221 at 8.
24 Id.
See note 3 supra.
2 See Civil No. 74-1221 at 12 n.7 where the court stated:
Because it was contended here that the 1964 settlement agree-
ments between Leesona Corporation and the patent owner, Chavanoz,
were in fact an antitrust conspiracy, the district court ordered produc-
tion of certain opinion work product materials since "the mental im-
pressions, opinions, conclusions and legal theories of the attorney in
the prior litigation are now operative facts as to the motive and intent
of the parties at the time of the settlement.". . As to the contentions
that fraud was practiced on the U.S. Patent Office, the court ordered
production of similar materials since "the mental impressions, opin-
ions, conclusions, and legal theories of the attorneys prosecuting the
patent applications for Chavanoz are now operative facts as to the
motive and intent of the patent owner. .. ."
1975]
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afford the documents absolute immunity from discovery." Conse-
quently, the court in ordering the defendant to produce some of the
controverted documents held that if the party seeking discovery dem-
onstrated the requisite "substantial need" and "undue hardship,"
the court in its discretion could order the production of this type of
document.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit considered the work product mate-
rials of Duplan for a second time.2 The court held that "opinion"
work product materials, as distinguished from materials not contain-
ing mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories, were
absolutely immune from discovery even though the litigation for
which they were prepared had been concluded. 29 "[N]o showing of
relevance, substantial need or undue hardship would justify com-
pelled disclosure of an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions or legal theories."3
The Fourth Circuit again based its holding on the language con-
tained in Rule 26(b)(3) and the policies underlying the Hickman
decision, explaining that the last sentence of Rule 26(b)(3) com-
manded the courts to afford "opinion" work product materials abso-
lute immunity from discovery.3' The Hickman holding established
that the thought processes of lawyers must be protected from public
examination in order to allow them to perform their duties effec-
tively. The court concluded that allowance of discovery in Duplan 11
would jeopardize the very activities that Hickman sought to protect.
Therefore, the court held that the policies of Hickman which were
implemented by Rule 26(b)(3) should be extended to a Duplan II
situation.
32
Noteworthy, however, is the fact that the court's holding did not
absolutely preclude discovery of documents containing mental im-
pressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories. The court held that
such documents were discoverable after the examining court excised
all mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories.3
Thus, in subsequent litigation, "factual" work product material pre-
" See note 25 supra.
Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, Civil No. 74-1221 (4th
Cir., Oct. 18, 1974).
Id. at 3.
Id. at 11-12.
3' The court noted the use of the word "shall" rather than "may" in the second
sentence of Rule 26(b)(3), note 3 supra, to support this proposition. Id. at 11-12.
32 Id. at 19.
Id. at 21. See 8 WmGT and MILLER, FEDERAL PRACMCE AND PROCEDURE § 2024
at 202 (1970).
